peacekeeping. However, we suggest that contributor-specic benets play the same role in UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions, in contrast with previous empirical studies on the nancial burden sharing.
Introduction
The post-cold war period has been characterized by peacekeeping operation and peace negotiations, with increased size, number and intensity of external interventions, particularly those sponsored by multilateral organizations. In this article we explore the supply-side of peacekeeping, the domestic and international determinants of a country's contributions to peacekeeping operations from 1999 to 2009.
There are three dimensions to peacekeeping: demand, the situation that allows for foreign military intervention; supply, the factors determining third parties' voluntary contribution to peace operations, and thus the willingness of states to provide that intervention and the constrained faced in meeting the demand; and the outcome of the operation, which is determined by the nature of the interaction. as the contribution to "reducing tensions where an armistice has been negotiated but a peace treaty has yet to be established". Therefore, it can be conceptualized as a military intervention designed to maintain or restore peace. On one hand, as Victor (2010) points out, peacekeeping is usually implemented when a cease-re has been established, and they rarely bring heavy armaments. On the other hand, recent cases have seen these forces impose their will or engage in active defense to accomplish their mandate (e.g. Bosnia and Somalia). Moreover, in examining the quantitative evidence on peacekeeping we encountered substantial methodological diculties in determining which foreign deployments of troops -in the internal conict of another state -should be counted as peacekeeping. The operational criteria we use (i.e. by SIPRI) states that the deployment is authorized by the UN with the stated intention to: (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conict prevention and/or peace-building eorts (see Bellamy et al., 2010 . Therefore, there are speci features ascribable to peacekeeping (e.g. the stated intention to contribute to the implementation of a peace process between the ghting parties), which make it distinct from other forms of third party intervention in conict. Thus, our article depart from the group of studies analyzing the reasons behind military interventions by external powers -broadly dened and excluding multilateral interventions (e.g. Mitchell, 1970; Pearson, 1974 ; Carment character under the auspices of the United Nations. Since peacekeeping generates public benets, we develop a theoretical model based on the private provision of public good. Empirically, we only single out interventions which conform with our operational criteria, although we recognize that in some cases the stated goal may be just rhetoric and may not reect the real motivations of the intervener.
Another group of quantitative studies on this topic analyses the nancial burden sharing of peacekeeping, to grasp the ratio of excludable to public benets generated by peace operations (e. Firstly, conict characteristics inuence the decision to intervene, and the size of the intervention. The risk of casualties, for example, is an important determinant and countries are reluctant to provide troops that might be placed at risk.
Secondly, a country's oers to provide personnel are subject to their overall national military capacity (e.g. force size, concurrent commitments, and logistical capabilities). Taken together, the capability to provide troops -sometimes congured to engage in combat operations -and the willingness to pay the human costs involves very dierent decision criteria. Thirdly, the quality of the troops selected has an impact on the outcome of the operation (e.g. British paratroops vs. Ghanian soldiers). Moreover, indiscipline among peacekeeping troops has also been a cause of concern.
3 A failure to accomplish the objectives of the operations may create embarrassment while the perpetration of crimes against the local population may lead to serious investigations by the UN. Finally, contributors can choose whether to deploy troops in some particular conict area; and they have more control over the use of their national contingents than their nancial contributions (Lebovic, 2004) . Therefore, the procedure for stang an operation follows more complex decision making processes. We believe that personnel contributions are better indicators of a country's motivations and constraints.
The quantitative studies most closely related to ours are Lebovic (2004) and Victor (2010) . Lebovic (2004) We do not limit our study to UN operations or sub-Saharan African states and we compare UN peacekeeping against other regional organizations.
The second main dierence with our work is our attempt to control for internationallevel and domestic-level factors. Our paper is broader in scope and addresses a dierent set of hypotheses, although it retains some of the variables used by the above-mentioned studies, notably the military capacities and the relative wealth of donor countries. We develop novel hypotheses, which explain contributions through 1) the "mercenarization"' of peacekeeping forces; 2) the ambition of the intervening nations; 3) their tolerance of casualties and 4) the constrains given by the number of concurrent operations; 5) the eect of humanitarian crises; and 6) the proximity to the country in conict. We apply our hypotheses to all the categories of operations to provide a basis for comparison. Therefore, we refrain from using some interesting control variables, such as regime type, where little or no variations would be found across a homogeneous group of countries (e.g.
NATO, EU and CIS).
We divide the intervention dilemma in two problems: (i) a country decision to participate (participation); and (ii) what determines the number of personnel a country supplies (troop contribution). Drawing on a theoretical model on public goods and on a number of qualitative arguments and quantitative studies, we formulate eight hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the dataset and a presentation of the panel methods used in the empirical analysis. Next, we present a panel analysis of individual countries personnel contributions to peace operation in the period 1999-2009. Finally, we discuss the inferences we might draw from the empirical investigation. A discussion of the dataset a table of descriptive statistics are included in the web-appendix, together with the replication data.
Theoretical model
We develop a theoretical model to identify how contrasting domestic and international forces shape a country's decision to participate in a peace mission and how they determine the size of its contribution, should it decide to intervene.
Considering the state as a rational actor maximizing utility subject to a resource constraint, it must decide (a) whether to intervene or not and (b) the number of troops to provide in case of participation. For the rst problem, we adapt Regan (1998) to describe peacekeeping missions, rather than military interventions broadly conceptualized. Next, we expand and modify his framework to allow for the size of a country's participation, and to derive the condition for eciency in terms of its troops commitment.
Participation
For the rst problem, we need to specify the expected utility for intervening EU I i and the expected utility for not intervening EU N i . We assume that both functions are strictly concave and increasing in their arguments. EU N i can be expressed as:
where p represents the probability that the conict will be settled without nation's i intervention, U p i is the nation's i utility attached to peace without her intervention and U c i is the utility of continued conict. For simplicity, we assume that there are no costs associated with not intervening.
Although international peace is traditionally regarded as a public good (Kindleberger, 1986), peacekeeping can not be considered as a pure public good. It is an hybrid good that posses some features of both public and private goods. Peace operations produce pure public benets and some excludable and rival contributorspecic benets. It is impurely public because its benets are not fully available to some countries and benets decline with the number of countries deriving gains from such missions (Cornes & Sandler, 1996) . Thus, peacekeeping yields joint products. Part are purely public to the international community; part are impurely public to a sub-group of countries; and part are country-specic to the participants (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002) .
For the reasons above, a nation's expected utility for intervening EU I i is given by:
where q is the probability of a successful intervention with nation's i contribution, U s i is the utility associated with a successful outcome and U f i reects the utility to the potential intervener from an unsuccessful intervention.
C I i are the costs associated with intervention.
The net benet of intervention is given by
When EU I − EU N > 0 there will be intervention. Therefore, the decision is strongly inuenced by the expected marginal impact of country i on the global intervention outcome, by the conict characteristics, captured by p, and by countries' individual preferences over outcomes. Here, we would need to assume a priori a sort of utility ordering, which is country-specic. For some countries the utility of continued ghting is higher than the utility from a failed peacekeeping inter- To simplify, let us assume that in Equation (3) the utilities to country's i from continued war, regardless of its intervention, are both small enough to be considered negligible, therefore U f i ≈ 0 and U c i ≈ 0. In the same equation, p and q account for the outcome of the intervention, which is decided by country's i participation and the coalition's relative investment in ghting. We consider a unique probability σ as a success ratio, given by
where the intervener ghting eort is measured by the scale of his deployment and M is the belligerents' strength and therefore their resistance against a third party involvement. When t i = T n−i = 0 there are no chances that the conict will be settled without any third party involvement. Let us dene a utility function, that captures the optimal number of troops to dispatch in peace operations. The utility is dened over the space of private and public characteristics, is strictly increasing in consumption of both the private and the public good, quasiconcave, continuous and everywhere twice dierentiable. Since peacekeeping generates excludable and rival contributor-specic benets, with an adaptation of Khanna et al. (1999) model and following Equation (3), country i's expected utility function can be written as follow: (5) Q is added to the function to capture any factor that can inuence the utility from peacekeeping, such as the international security threat posed by the conict and the proximity to the conict area. C i (t i ) are the costs of participation. The cost function is continuous, increasing in its argument t i , dierentiable and convex because each additional unit of boots on the ground requires increasingly higher costs. Accounting for the cost of a peace mission is complicated. 4 Besides the military costs, the most important is the loss of life in peacekeepers ranks. The value of life is usually compared to the discounted value of earnings foregone by individuals. We assume that the cost function can be expressed as
where V SL is the unit cost of a soldier, that is the value of life. Public choices about safety in a society require estimates of the willingness of people to trade o wealth for a reduction in the probability of death. The literature on the topic assumes that V SL is increasing in the individual's willingness to pay (W T P ) to reduce the risk of death -or on his willingness to accept a certain amount to see his life expectancy reduced -and decreasing in the probability of death R (Bellavance et al., 2009 ). In our context R is the risk of a mission.
Dening x as the nation-specic output αt i and y as the global public characteristics β(t i ), the rst order condition for t i can be found by maximizing (5) and can be written as
The condition for eciency is that the marginal benet of providing peacekeeping (left-hand side of Equation 7) equals the marginal costs (right-hand side).
The marginal benet is the sum of the utility weighted by the marginal impact of a soldier on the probability that intervention will be successful and the marginal utility of the private and purely public activity weighted by the probability of success. The marginal benet is oset by the sum of the opportunity cost of having less soldiers for national duties times the probability of success and the expected marginal cost of casualties.
To summarize, we draw a number of intuitions from the model. A raise in country i contribution increases the success ratio, and therefore the probability Why states choose to intervene: testable hypothesis
We rely on the intuitions of the theoretical model and on a number of qualitative and quantitative studies to categorize peacekeeping motivations. We distinguish between participation and contribution, along decisions related to the nature of the operation; the nature of the conict and the region at stake; and the characteristic of the intervener. We identify seven explanations of peacekeeping.
Hypothesis 1. Conict spillover: a geographic proximity to the country in conict increases the likelihood of participation.
A geographic proximity to the country in conict increases the utility a neighboring country expects to get from the cessation of the hostilities. Sharing a border with a country at war means an increase in the probability of instability in the surrounding area (spill over eects). As a consequence the national security is endangered by the risk of geographic contagion (Gleditsch, 2007) . We also use additional covariates related to the labor market scenario, such as the unemployment rate and the tertiary enrollment rate, to capture the relative value of labor.
Hypothesis 3. Tolerance of casualties: the valuation of life in wealthier nations envisages a casualty-adverse approach that leads to engagements with lower casualty risk.
Equations (6) and (7) underline the importance of the unit cost of a soldier and the expected marginal costs of casualties in the participation dilemma. In some countries public openness to peace operations does not automatically extend to actions involving combat and politicians have to carefully justify the operation's nature. The tolerance for causalities is often an obstacle, and it is deemed to be one of the causes behind the unexpected US withdraw from Somalia in 1994. The political system of wealthier countries has a greater sensitivity to the higher value of life associated with economic growth. Public support for risky foreign policies is fragile and precipitately erodes with failure (Mueller, 1971 We consider the number of deaths among the peacekeepers as a signal of the level of risk of any operation. High fatality rates among the peacekeepers inform the intervener about the cost-tolerance of combatants.
Hypothesis 4. Level of threat: given an ongoing conict, the greater the security threats posed are, the higher the likelihood and size of participation will be. 6 When a conict is regarded as a threat to the regional, and sometimes global stability, security concerns will trigger nation-specic responses (see the parameter Q in Equation 5).
A public that feels insecure and has a perception of international security threats is likely to support demanding international operations, like the NATO intervention in the Balkans. The need to keep energy supplies owing and international waterways accessible during regional crises may also justify intervention, such as the EU maritime operation o the cost of Somalia.
In presence of a clear threat, there is no lack of political will and the deployment is rapid and powerful (Lahneman, 2004) . This hypothesis presents a realistic framework on the international dimension of civil wars. We use the conict intensity as a proxy for the level of threat that a conict poses.
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Hypothesis 5. Humanitarian intervention: the participation increases in presence of a large population displacement or an imminent humanitarian crisis.
Existing humanitarian norms at the international system level inuence the extent of humanitarian military intervention by states (Finnemore, 2008) . But there are also benets to intervening in civil wars with humanitarian implications, and domestic costs to not intervening. Such an approach is particularly manifested when public opinion and media pressure urge national governments to intervene.
Public demands for action are reactive; they arise after widespread media coverage of human rights violations has raised public awareness. The physiological eect of the media coverage of civil wars encourages leaders' response. Shaw (1996) argues that the "`CNN eect"' has completely transformed foreign policy-making and has changed the media-government interaction in the context of humanitarian intervention. Dowty & Loescher (1996) suggest that refugee ows can impose costs that aect the national interests and that interventions in conicts with large refugee ows are justied by international conventions. . We use the number of internally displaced persons to test whether humanitarian motivations are associated with the decision to intervene and the size of participation. 
Econometric models
The aim of the empirical investigation is to analyse the factors determining a country's decision to participate (participation); and those explaining the number of soldiers deployed by a country in a specic mission (contribution). We use static discrete choice models to analyse the probability of participating; and xed eects and rst dierence panel regression models when we look at the contribution. For each problem, we now discuss the choice of the sample, the covariates and the functional form. 
where x is a vector of strictly exogenous observed explanatory variables and β is the associated coecient vector. The covariates vector x includes information on the conict, the peace operation and the participating country. The model also has a random intercept α i to account for individual-specic unobserved characteristics. Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variate.
The standard uncorrelated random eects model assumes α i uncorrelated with
x it . Alternatively, following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain et al., (1984) , correlation between α i and the observed characteristics can be allowed by assuming a relationship of the form α i = x i a + ε i and with ε i independent of x i . Thus the model may be written as:
To check for robustness of the random eect probit, we run a random eect complementary log log specication, which take into account any asymmetry in the distribution of the dependent variable. Finally, to relax the distributional assumption about the unobserved heterogeneity parameter, we estimate a linear probability model with xed eects.
Modelling troop contribution
In the second empirical part, we try to identify the determinants of the number of soldiers a participant country deploys in a particular mission. Therefore the sample is made up of those that contribute.
The model is specied as:
where f i is the time invariant country-specic eects and it is the error term. In order to eliminate the xed eect f i we apply two customary transformations of the original model: rst dierences and the within transformation. The rst- 
The within model is obtained by subtraction of the time-averaged model from the original model (10) . Then:
In both procedures the country-specic eects f i is removed.
Modelling contribution poses a sample selection problem. Since the decision to intervene precedes the one about the number of troops to dispatch, the sample is apparently non-randomly selected. Model estimates based on such non-randomly selected sample might be biased leading to erroneous conclusions (Heckman, 1981).
Furthermore, the distribution of troops' contribution takes on non-negative values. A censored regression model might solve the problem and take care of the censoring by postulating a latent distribution of troops' contribution for nonparticipant. However, this last hypothesis is somehow puzzling for three reasons:
rstly, as mentioned above, there are countries incapable of projecting troops abroad and/or having no military resources. Troops' contribution for these countries is necessarily zero. Secondly, the assumption of latent negative values of the distribution of troops' contribution cannot be supported. Thirdly, the censored regression model relies on the normality assumption of the latent variable, which is a strong parametric assumption. Tobit-type latent variable models make sense if the data we are working with are truly censored.
8 In addition, the panel structure of our data would be mathematically complex to combine with a censored regression model; a large burden of computer programming and a set of strong distributional assumptions would be necessary for such a combination (see Hisiao, 2001 ). Some scholars propose the use of non-parametric estimators for correcting selection bias (amongst others Kyriazidou (1997) ), but no method has been widely accepted so far. As a consequence, we decide to rely on the customary linear panel model. than relying on some specic procedure which is far from universally accepted, we choose to carry out our analysis by using more customary econometric tools.
One might argue that the underlying process both for participation and troops contributions is dynamic, that is, it is likely that the decision in the previous
This choice might also have its counterpart whether the linear panel model is not the right one. A more extensive investigation is needed and we leave it for future research.
Empirical results Table I provides estimates for alternative versions of the participation problem and reports the estimates for the linear probability model, probit and complementary log log model respectively. As robustness check, we run the regressions including time dummies, alternative measures of distance and covariates related to the labor market scenario. The results apply to UN operations only for the reasons mentioned in the previous section.
Tables from II to IV provide the rst-dierence estimates and the within estimates for alternative versions of the troops contribution equation. In Table II we report the factors aecting the size of contribution in UN missions; in Table III we present a panel estimates of the drivers of non-UN troops contribution; and in Table IV the estimates of the NATO-led and EU missions alone.
Participation
Results in Table II gesting that the higher the security threat and the humanitarian implications that a conict poses, the higher the probability of contributing to a UN operation is.
In a study on outside unilateral interventions in internal conicts, Regan (1998) also considers these two factors and nds two opposite eects. While humanitarian crises are associated with an increase in the probability of intervention, an increase in the intensity of the conict decreases the probability of intervention. Our study corroborates his ning that presence of a large population displacement or an imminent humanitarian crisis, the probability of participation increases. Therefore, the role of humanitarian issues and concerns about an impending humanitarian crisis seems quite established. However, we argue that when the conict is of high intensity -and the associated threat is of high risk -it plays a similarly large and critical role in determining the decision to intervene.
Hypothesis 6 is also conrmed. We measure the sustainability of deployment We start with Table II, The results for NATO and EU operations can be seen in Table IV . We present these two sets of operations together to oer an homogeneous group of countries, sharing many economic and geopolitical features. We are not able to further narrow down the set of countries (e.g. only AU or EU) due to an insucient number of observations. The results present some relevant exceptions, in which the sign of the coecient is not in the direction predicted by the theoretical arguments.
The number of deaths among troops is positive, suggesting that Western countries are more prone to dispatch large contingents in operations presenting risks of casualties. The main driver of NATO and EU peacekeeping is the conict intensity, while the number of concurrent operations hampers the size of their contributions.
The most important insight in this Table is Table I : Linear probability model, random eect probit and complementary log log for partecipation probability, UN missions Linear probability model εi and the observed characteristics is allowed by assuming a relationship of the form: εi = xa + αi,where αi ∼ iidN (0, σ Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
